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A NEW LEGAL PROBLEM IN THE RELATIONS OF
CAPITAL AND LABOR
The problem referred to in the title may be stated concisely
as follows:. Will the law uphold a contract between a workman
and his labor-union whereby he agrees for a period of two years
not to work in a non-union shop?
It is believed not only that this question is novel, but that its
determination will be fraught with great consequences.

The case which first raised it was that of The Intcrnation2
Stcrcotypcrs and Elkctrotypcrs Union No. 31 V. Meyer.' It
appears that Local No. 31 of the International Stereotypers
and Electrotypers Union of Cincinnati, Ohio, entered into a contract with each of its members, wherein the member agreed that
for a period of two years from July 28, 1921, he would not enter
into an agreement with any employer which should provide that
the shop of the employer was to be operated on a non-union basis,
that is to say, that members of a labor-union would lie refused
employment in such shop because of their membership in a union,.
and the member further agreed that he would not accept any
employment with an understanding that the employer would not
recQgnize labor-unions, or with the understanding that he would
not be or become a member of any labor-union while employed
'Superior Court of Hamilton County, Ohio, September 5, z923. A summary of the facts and some quotations from the opinion of the court are given
in the issue of September, 1924 (volume 6, No. 9) of the periodical entitled
"Law and Labor," published in New York by the League for Industrial Rights.
(523)
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by said employer. The consideration for this promi.se was alleged
to be work to be done and money to be expended by the union in
advancing the conditions of workers and the material prosperity
of the members of the worker's craft in the community where he
worked.
Notwithstanding this contract, Meyer, who was. one of the
union members signing such an agreenieht, on January 29. 1923,
while there was a strike on in the industry, went to work for the
McDonald Printing Company of Cincinnati, which operated upon
a non-union basis and which entered into an understanding with
Meyer that he would not have dealings with any labor-union, and
that he was not and would not become or continue to be a member
of a labor-union during the period of his employment.
On April II, 1923, the union in question brought a bill in
equity praying that Meyer be restrained for a period of two years
from July 28, 19i2, from working for the McDonald Printing
Company, or any other establishment, contrary to, and in violation of, his agreement with the union. The defendant demurred.
The court in its opinion refused to decide the case, because the
contract between the union and Meyer expired by its own limitations on July 28, 1923, before the court had time to arrive at a
decision, and therefore the question was moot.
It will be noted that the case arose on an attempt to enjoin
Meyer from working for any employer in violation of his agreement with the union. The question came up for the second time
in American courts, but in a somewhat different form, in the case
of The Philadelphia Electrotypers and Finishers Union No. 72
v. Bethlehem Plate Company.2 In that case the plaintiff filed a
bill in equity alleging that on April 3, 1923, the Electrotypers
union entered into a written contract with each of its members,
including one J. M. Davis, wherein each member agreed that for
a period of two years he would not accept employment as an electrotyper in any shop which operated upon a non-union basis, or
where the employer would not recognize labor-unions, or with
any understanding or agreement that the employee was not a
'Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.
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member or would not become a member of any labor-union during his employment, or with any understanding that the employee's right to become affiliated with organized labor and to
hold and retain membership in the union was to be in any way
restricted or prohibited, or in any shop which had been declared
unfair by-the union. The consideration for this agreement was
stated to be the union's acceptance of the member's application
for membership, the benefits accruing to him from being a member of the union, the entering into similar agreements by his fellow-members of the union, the money spent and to be spent by
the union, and the work done and to be done by it for the benefit
of the craft and in protecting and improving the wages and working conditions of electrotypers, and the paying of burial and death
benefits. The bill in equity alleged that, notwithstanding this
agreement, Davis, on October 7, 1924, entered into the employ
of the defendant, the Bethlehem Plate Company, which operated
its shop on a non-union basis, this employment being effected as
a result of the solicitation of Davis by the Bethlehem Plate Company, although the latter had full knowledge of the existing contract between Davis and the union. The plaintiff, unlike the
union in the Cincinnati case, asked for an injunction, not against
Davis, but against the Bethlehem Plate Company, to restrain it
from continuing to employ Davis, and from soliciting or enticing any other members of the union to break their contracts with
it.
The bill in equity in this case was filed on December 17, 1924.
The defendant demurred, but the case was not argued until a
date so near to the expiration of the two years for which Davis
had contracted with the union that the court was not able to decide
it -within the period during which alone the decision would be of
any practical effect. Therefore this case also was dismissed, as
Was the Cincinnati case, as involving a moot question. As far
as the writer knows the question thus remains undecided by any
court, and there is left for future judicial consideration the important question whether a contract by a union with its members
that they will not work for a stipulated future period in a nonunion shop is one that is valid and enforceable.
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That the question is important is readily obvious. If such
an agreement is valid it will prove to be a powerful weapon in
the hands of the unions on the one hand, and, if adopted by manufacturers, in the hands of capital on the other. If the unions can
sign up enough persons to agree that they will not for a specified
time work in non-union shops, and if employers of labor can
contract with enough workingmen that the latter will not, for a
given period of years, work in union shops, or become or remain
members of unions, the ranks of the two forces will thus be correspondingly augmented in the historic battle between the army
of labor to establish its power and combinations of capitalists
to seek free markets of labor. Indeed the practical result of declaring such an agreement valid might involve a picturesque consequence. As each man attained the age of twenty-one years,
and thus became capable of entering into a bindingcontract, he
would be importuned by trade-union men on the one hand, and by
,nti-union employers on the other, to sign away his freedom for
a specified period of years, two, five, ten or more, as the case
might be, and to agree that during that term he would or would
not be a union man; and we would thus have the spectacle of both
employees and employers seeking in the pool of labor, as each
person therein reached his majority, to align such person, by
binding contract, on the side of trade-unionism or against it.
The visualization of such a situation leads vividly to reflection, of
the great consequences that might, and probably would result
in the industrial world.
It is because of this apparent importance of the question thit
it is herewith presented for analysis and consideration by students of lav, the intention of the writer, for obvious reasons,
being not to express any opinion or conclusion in regard thereto;
but rather to marshal the conflicting principles and arguments
applicable to the case, and to indicate the extent to which existing
decisions throw any light upon the solution of the problem when
it shall finally be presented for judicial determination.
It has already been noted that in the Cincinnati case the
action was against the mechanic himself who had entered into
the agreement with his labor-union, and it sought to enjoin him
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from working in a non-union shop. Perhaps it might have been
successfully contended against the plaintiff in that action that a
contract not to work for another employer or general type of
employer would not be enforced in equity by injunction, because
of analogy to the cases which hold that, since a person cannot be
compelled to work, the same result cannot be attained by indirection by enforcing a negative covenant not to work for another,
unless the case falls within the well-known exception that the
person has such unusual or unique skill in the practice of his trade
or profession that his services are practically irreplaceable. On
the other hand, this principle might not be applicable to the case
in hand, in that the contract between the mechanic and his union
did not call for the rendering to the union of personal services
upon his part, as would have been the case had the contract been
with an employer, but was merely to the effect that in return for
the benefits derived from membership in the union he would not
work for a proscribed class of employers. Be this as it may,
however, this question did not arise in the Philadelphia case, inasmuch as there the bill in equity sought to restrain, not the mechanic, but the non-union employer, who, with knowledge of the
agreement between the mechanic and the union, nevertheless successfully solicited the mechanic to break that agreement and to
work for the non-union shop. The law seems-to be established
that in such a case relief can be had; that is to say that a third person can be enjoined from seeking to break any contract between
two other persons where he does so deliberately and with malice,
intenand malice means merely the doing of a wrongful act
arise
difficulty
tionally and knowingly. Neither does any great
in regard to the question as to whether the damage to'the union
in such a case would be irreparable, since in law irreparability
any
includes situations where the damages cannot be measured by
all
that
seem
definite or accurate standard. In short, it would
of
such collateral matters would not militate against the right
quesonly
the
that
and
discussion,
injunction in the case under
tion, and the important question, for discussion, is as to whether
not
or not the agreement itself is valid; that is to say, whether or
it is consistent with "public .policy."
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The doctrine of "public policy" is one which, though continuously criticised in judicial opinions and by philosophers of
the law, took root at an early stage in the history of English
jurisprudence. Its opponents have always denounced it as
judicial legislation; its defenders have iisisted that judges upon
the bench vested by the people with governmental powers cannot
enforce private contracts which obviously tend to the impairment of the public welfare and which can no more be adequately
covered by statutory legislation than the myriads of cases which
continually arise in the administration of the common law. From
the very nature of the doctrine it is impossible that there should
be any definition of it by the courts as applicable by rule of thumb
to the various cases that arise, and it has been left quite as undefined as "fraud" and similar subjects. Moreover it is necessarily fluctuating and uncertain, varying with the evolution of
moral standards, the change of economic conditions, the usages
of trade, and, in general, the social conditions and habits of
thought of each successive generation which studies and enforces
it.
Under the doctrine of "public policy" arise questions of the
enforcement of contracts in restraint of trade and limiting the
right and duty of labor. In the early stages of the English law,
when the rule originated, trade was in its infancy, and the number
of mechanics in England was limited. As a result the judges
viewed any such restraint or limitation with alarm, and frowned
upon any attempts which seemed to bear in their train undesirable results to the industry and commerce of the nation. Later,
however, as population and trade increased, the stringency in the
enforcement of the rule of "public policy" as applicable to these
subjects was abated, and accordingly, instead of the courts holding all contracts in restraint of trade and labor illegal and void,
the ban of the law was placed only upon such contracts as were
unduly broad and unreasonable in their operation,. while, on the
other hand, restraints which were properly limited as to time and
place and were based upon reasonable grounds were held valid
and were enforced.
The theory upon which such limitations and restraints were

A NEW LEGAL PROBLEM OF CAPITAL AND LABOR

529

discountenanced was apparently twofold in its conception. On
the one hand, there was taken into consideration the injury to the
party himself who was being precluded from pursuing his occupation and thus prevented from supporting himself and his family.
On the other hand, there was involved the detriment to the public
welfare in that the capacity of the. individual to labor -and to
produce. constitutes his value to the public, and the branch of industry to which he is-best fitted is presumably the one in which
he can render the greatest profit and service to the community.
These two grounds as constituting the basis of the doctrine that
contracts in restraint of trade and labor are invalid as against
pnblic policy are enunciated and explained by Mr. Justice Bradley
in Oregon Steam Nazigation Company v. Winsor.3
The application of the doctrine of "public policy" to the
question now under discussion rests, however, upon far deeper
and more fundamental considerations than those involved in the
historical aspect of the cases involving restraint of trade and of
labor. If the matter were one merely of a contract by an individual mechanic not to work for a specified time in a given
industry or for a particular employer or set of employers, there
would probably be little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion
that such a contract would be valid if based upon a propriety pf
objects to be attained. We are familiar with the common case
of the owner of a store selling it to another and agreeing that he
will,not for a certain period engage in a similar business within
a specified locality. The reasonable necessities of such a case
and the obvious purpose designed to be accomplished, being fair
and reasonable, outweigh the comparatively remote and unimportant loss to the public resulting from the vendor's self-imposed
obligation to restrain from further continuation of the business
which he had theretofore conducted. So it would seem that in
regard to a contract whereby a laborer agrees that for a certain
period he will not work for a person other than the one with
whom he is contracting, or that while certain conditions exist
he will not lend his services to certain proscribed employers, if
2o Wail. 64 (U. S., 1873).
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there are apparently good reasons, economic and social, for such
restraining covenant, there is no more reason why, viewing the
matter merely from the standpoint of such an individual contract, it should not be enforced as being legal and valid, than in
the case of the sale of the store, the only deleterious effect on the
industrial world in general being the loss of the laborer's work
so far as his contract prevents him from pursuing it. But modern
industrial life is quite different from that of the more primitive
days when such considerations were the only ones involved in
these contracts. The problems of union and non-union labor,
the growth of trade-unionism, and the various industrial complications resulting therefrom, have shaken the modern economic
world to its depths, and have assumed gigantic aspects of social
and industrial policy that render the subject far more subtle and
difficult than in earlier times. The world has become more
integrated, and production proceeds upon far more complicated
lines. Concentrations of capital on the one hand, and associations
of labor on the other, have organized for relative supremacy,
and therefore the question of public policy in regard to their
relations, especially in a matter so profound as that involved in
the case under discussion, demands much more analysis and insight than at a period when all of these factors were relatively
simple and subject to easier comprehension and solution.
Entering now upon a more specific consideration of the question involved, our first inquiry should be: is the contract a reasonable one as between the parties; has it a valid raison d'etre?
On this point it must be remembered at the outset that laborunions are not only not under the ban of the law, but that on the
contrary they are considered proper agencies for the advancement
of the interests of their members, and therefore are subject to
legal protection and encouragement. From this it follows that
there is nothing presumptively unreasonable, or in itself to be
deprecated, in the terms of a contract which serve to further the welfare of such unions. It is obviously to the interest
of a trade-union that it should secure adhesion to its principles
by as many eligible persons as possible, and it is equally obvious
that this purpose is accomplished in large measure by having such

A NEW LEGAL PROBLEM OF CAPITAL AND LABOR

531

persons agree that they will adhere to the principles of tradeunionism and to that end will refrain from working in nonunion shops. Nor is there anything unreasonable in the attitude
of a union which seeks to insist that its members, at least as long
as they remain in the union, should not violate its principles by
encouraging shops whose policy is directed against those principles. NV' ai41 it, for example, be unreasonable for a Republican
or a Democratic political club to insist that, as long as persons remain members of such club, they should not vote the ticket of
the opposite party? Or would it be unreasonable for a church
organization to demand that its members should not worship in a
church deemed heretical by the one in which such membership
existed? Or that a temperance organization should seek to bind
its members in an agreement under which they assumed the obligation of not indulging in intoxicating liquors while such membership continued? It would seem that where there is an incompatability between membership in a certain organization and
action on the part of the member contrary to the principles of
that organization, it is not unreasonable for the organization to
seek agreements by its members to restrain from doing things
or accepting responsibilities contrary and inimical to the principles involved in the acceptance and retention of such membership.
Upon the question, however, as to whether the agreement
now under consideration is or is not reasonable, it is to be noted
that the obligation assumed by Davis was not merely that he
would not work for a union shop as long as he remained a member of the Electrotypers union, but that he would not work in
such a shop for a specified period, namely two years; and this
involves a somewhat more difficult problem. Davis might sever
his connection with the union during the period of two years
and yet be bound until the expiration of that period from working contrary to his assumed obligation. In other words, the
obligation not to work in a non-union shop was categorical; the
mechanic was not given the alternative of avoiding an incongruous situation by either working in union shops or resigning
from the union, but he bound himself for the time specified not
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to work in a non-union shop, whether during that time he'remained in the union or otherwise. Is such provision reasonable?
Suppose the time stipulated -had been five or ten or twenty-five
years, or even during Davis' entire life? In the case of the sale
of a store the covenant not to engage in a competing business
must, as to geographical extent and the period of time during
vhich the obligation is to be binding, bear a proper and reasonable relation to the necessities and circumstances of the case. It
is to be argued in favor of the Validity of Davis' restriction that
the union might contract with employers in the particular industry concerned to furnish them with union labor for a period
of two years or other specified term; that is to say, under methods
of collective bargaining which sometimes prevail in certain industries, obligations are entered into between employers and the
unions covering definite periods of time, and the union therefore
might take the position that in order to be able to carry out such
agreements with the employers and to furnish them with the
labor stipulated at the time required, it is necessary for the union
to have contracts with its own members covering a similar period
of time. In determining, therefore, whether or not such a contract is reasonable, the purpose of the restriction must be considered, and its "reasonableness" must be determined with reference to all the factors and conditions which as a practical matter
enter into a consideration of the case from the economic and industrial standpoint.
Suppose it be determined as the result of such considerations
that the agreement not to.work in a non-union shop for a given
period such as two years is reasonable. Our inquiry would not
thereby be concluded, for such determination in itself would not
constitute a final answer as to the validity of the contract. It is
possible to conceive that an agreement may be reasonable as far
as the parties to it are concerned and yet be against public policy;
or, to put it otherwise, an agreement must be both reasonable
as between the parties and consistent with the public welfari.
The very object of the doctrine of "public policy" is to view such
contracts from the standpoint of the general public, and even
though the contracting parties themselves may have no desire to
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harm the public, may have no improper or malicious motives
against any third person, and may in good faith enter into a
contract reasonably justified by their own proper interests, nevertheless the general effect of that and similar contracts may be
inimical to the interests of society as a whole. A contract which
is not reasonable may, because of that objection alone, be against
public policy and therefore invalid, but, on the other.hand, even
though reasonable as between the parties, it may still be against
public policy from the larger social viewpoint, and therefore not
judicially enforceable.' If this be true it follows that prevailing
industrial conditions affecting the relations of labor and capital
must always be considered in order to ascertain whether contracts
are apt to result in such an undesirable economic and industrial
situation that, from a pragmatic point of view, they should be
put under the ban of the judicial branch of the government.
With these general considerations in mind, we are prepared
to examine the authorities and see what light they throw upon
the question as to'whether or not public policy should permit the
making of a contract which definitely, and for a given period,
aligns laborers and mechanics on the side of the union or the
non-union shop, and, if it appear from them that public policy
should permit such a contract, whether and to what extent the
right is to be limited and held within bounds. Perhaps the best
way *ofstudying the recorded decisions is with reference to the
parties between whom the contracts are made. It is conceivable
that such a contract may be entered into between an employer
and employees stipulating either that the employer will take into.
his shop only a specified type of employees or that the employees
will maintain only certain associations and -uphold certain principles if taken into such employ. Or the contract may be made
between an employer and a labor organization stipulating that
the employer will take into his shop only union or other approved
employees and that the labor organization in return will furnish
such workmen for the employer. Or, as a third possibility, an
agreement may be made among employers stipulating that they
will not employ certain persons or types of labor, or among
employees stipulating that they will not work for certain em-
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ployers or classes of employers. While this classification has, so
far as the writer knows, not been definitely or at least generally
made a ratio decidendi, nevertheless it is believed that the principles of law applicable are different according to the parties who
enter into such contracts.
Let us, therefore, first examine cases in which the contract
is entered into between employer and employees.
The most interesting of these is Hitchnan Coal & Coke
Company v.. Mitchell,4 a case which was decided by a divided
court, since Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Clark dissented. In
that case the plaintiff established its mine on a non-union basis,
under an agreement with its employees that the plaintiff would
continue so to ran its mine and would not recognize the union:
that if any man wanted to become a member of the union he was
at liberty to do so, but he could not be a member and remain
in plaintiff's employ. The defendants (representatives of an organization of mine-workers), with full knowledge of this agreement, tried to induce the plaintiff's employees to join the union
and at the same time to break their agreement with the plaintiff by remaining in its employ afterjoining. The motive for
this action on the part of the defendants was not to enlarge the
membership of the union, but to coerce the plaintiff, through a
strike or the threat of one, irito recognition of the union. It was
held by the majority of the court that the plaintiff was entitled
to an injunction. While the court discussed the question of the
bona fides of the defendants' intentions as affecting the question
of malice, nevertheless the opinion is placed squarely upon the
ground that an employer is as free to make non-membership in
a union a condition of employment as the workingman is free
to join the union.
A quick inference from this decision, but perhaps a faulty
one, would be that if, as thus decided, an employer can agree with
his employees that his shop is to be strictly a non-union one, that
is to say, that he will not employ union men, it should conversely
be true that the members of a union can agree that they will not
4245 U. S. 229 (1917).
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work in a non-union shop. The temptation to such inference
should be controlled until consideration is given to the cases hereinafter referred to where the contract is made, not between employer and employees, but among employees themselves in regard to their relations to their employers. Indeed in this very
Hitchman case in the opinion of the District Court 5 there is an
approval of a quotation from Sir William Erle's "Memorandum
on the Law Relating to Trade Unions," filed with the eleventh
report of the Royal Commissioners in 1869, wherein it is stated
that while" "each person has a right to choose whether he will
labour or not, and also to choose the terms on which he will consent to labour," and while such power of choice "which one person may exercise and declare singly, many after consultation
may exercise and declare jointly," nevertheless "they cannot
create any mutual obligation having the legal effect of binding
each other not to work or not to employ unless upon terms allowed by the combination. Any arrangement for that purpose,
whatever may be its purport or form, does not bind as an agreement, but is illegal, though not unlawful, on account of restraint
of trade, and therefore void."
In Flaccus v. Smith," an employer, who ran a non-union
shop, had a contract with his apprentices by which they covenanted not to join labor-unions. It was held that he might maintain a bill in equity for an injunction to restrain persons with a
knowledge of this fact from enticing his apprentices to break
their covenants and to become members of a union. The court
said, per Mr, Justice Brown, that "The appellee had an unquestioned right, in the conduct of his business, to employ workmen
who were independent of any labor-union, and he had the further
right to adopt a system of apprenticeship which excluded his apprentices from membership in such a union. He was responsible
to no one for his reasons in adopting such a system, and no one
had a right to interfere with it to his prejudice or injury."
In Mills v. United States Printing Company,7 it was held
2D02 Fed. 512 (1913).
4 z99 Pa. x28, 48 At. 894 (igoi).
'99 App. Div. 6oS, 91 N. Y. Supp. z85 (z9o4).
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that an agreement made in settlement of a strike among the employees of a printing company, by which the latter agreed that it
would in the future employ only members of the labor union to
which the striking employees belonged, was valid, where it appeared that the purpose of the agreement was not maliciously
to injure the non-union men theretofore employed by the company, but to advance the legitimate interests of the striking employees. It .may be mentioned at this point that many of the
cases make much of the motive or intention with which such
agreements are entered into, and seek to ascertain, as a controlling basis of decision, whether the primary purpo se is for the
interests of the contracting parties or maliciously to injure third
persons, but it is not thought that such a criterion is sufficiently
specific or concrete to furnish the test as to the validity or invalidity of such agreements. All contracts presumably are made
for the mutual interests of those who enter into them, and many
contracts, whether so intended or not, necessarily involve harm
or loss to third persons who by the very terms of the contract
are not to receive its benefits. The matter of intention, and of
mental processes in general, is rarely helpful in the determina.
tion of legal rights.
Cases holding similarly to those just cited exist in reasonable profusion, and therefore it may be stated with some degree
of assurance, that an employer may enter into an agreement with
his own employees stipulating that he will employ only union
men or non-union men, as the case may be, and the employees
agreeing in return that they will or will not belong to a union, as
a condition of their employment. Of course there are some cases
which do not consistently follow these principles to an inevitable
conclusion. Take, for example, the case of Erdman v. Mitchell."
In that case members of an incorporated trade union and members
of an unincorporated trade union were working on a large building. A strike was ordered by the unincorporated union, and twothirds of the men quit work. Thereupon the managers of the
unincorporated union made an agreement with the contractors
*2o7 Pa. 79, 56 Adt. 327 (i9o$).
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that if the incorporated union men were discharged the strike
would be called off. This arrangement was carried out and work
was resumed. Subsequently the unincorporated union men announced that they would pursue the same course in future and
drive every member of the incorporated union into the unincorporated union. It was held that a court of equity would interfere by injunction to protect the members of the incorporated
union, the court saying that while "trade unions may cease to
work for reasons satisfactory to their members," nevertheless "if
they combine to prevent others from obtaining work by threats
of a strike or combine to prevent an employer from employing
others by threats of a strike, they combine to establish an unlawful purpose," and their action amounts to a criminal conspiracy.
The court quotes from i Eddy on Combinationt 416, to the
effect that "a threat to strike unless their wages are advanced
is something very different from a threat to strike unless workmen who are not members of the combination are discharged,"
the one purpose being legitimate and the injury inflicted on the
employer merely incidental, while in the other case the object
sought is the injury to a third party and the benefit to the members of the combination is remote as compared to the harm inflicted upon the non-union workmen.
Logically it would appear that the members of the unincorporated union had the right to enter into a contract with the employer whereby the latter should agree that he would not continue to employ, and would not take into his employ, members
of the incorporated union, and if such right existed then the position assumed by them that they would leave their employ unless
such result were brought about would not seem to be beyond their
legal prerogatives. Here again, however, the court dealt with
the question of motive, and sought to distinguish between a
primary and an incidental purpose and between direct and remote
injury. Be this as it may, however, the fad remains that, generally speaking, and according to the weight of authority, agreements between an employer and his employees are valid if they
provide that the employer shall employ only certain groups of
workmen or that the workmen shall be union men or non-union
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men, or that they should belong to some specific organization.
Indeed this is true to such an extent that uniformly it has been
held that a statute which makes it unlawful for an employer to
require an employee to agree not to become or remain a member
of any labor organization during the term of the employment
is in itself invalid and unconstitutional as an impairment of the
freedom of contract and therefore of property rights. This was
ruled in the ease of an act of Congress in Adair v. United States,9
and as affecting a state statute in Coppage v. Kansas 10 (in which
there was a vigorous and interesting dissenting opinion by Justices Day and Hughes), the court saying that "To ask a man to
agree in advance to refrain from affiliation with the union while
retaining a certain position of employment is not to ask him to
give up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is free to
decline the employment on those terms, just as the employer may
decline to offer employment on any other; and, having accepted
employment on those terms, the employee is still free to join
the union ivhen the period of employment expires, or, if employed
at all, then at any time upon simply quitting the employment;
and if bound by his own agreement to refrain from joining during a stated period of employment he is in no different situation
tfrom that which is necessarily incident to term contracts in general. .

.

. Freedom of contract, from the very nature of the

thing, can be enjoyed only by being exercised; and each particular exercise of it involves making an engagement which if
fulfilled prevents for the 'time any inconsistent course of conduct." "
We pass now to a consideration of the cases in which agreements are made, not between employer and employees, but between an employer and a labor organization providing that the
employer will take into his shop only employees with certain
qualifications and the labor organization agreeing in return to
furnish such workmen to the employer. This in a way may be
'2o8 U. S. x61 (iO98).
1236 U. S. 1 (1914).

" To the same effect are Goldfield Consolidated Mines Company v. Goldfield Miners Union No. 220, x59 Fed. 5oo (C. C. 19o8) and People v. Marcus;
x85 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073 (i9o6).
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considered as a modification of the situation embodied in the first
group of cases; in other words, instead of an employer contracting directly with his employees, he contracts with a labor organization which may be considered as the agent of the employees
or at least as representing their interests. Although, as a general proposition, it may be stated that such agreements are just
as lawful as when made between employer and employees directly,
nevertheless the cases are not entirely in accord, or at least there
are some variations in the facts which call for corresponding
differentiation in treatment.
12
In Underwood v. Tcxas & Pacific Railway Co., the
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen entered into an agreement
with certain railroad companies whereby the latter agreed that
eighty-five per cent. of their respective employees should be
Brotherhood men. This agreement prevented the plaintiffs, who
belonged to a certain switchmen's union not connected with the
Brotherhood, from obtaining work, and they asked for an injunction against the parties to the agreement, setting forth that
they were trained as railroad switchmen, and that unless they
could get employment as such they could not support themselves.
The court refused the injunction and held the contract valid,
saying that the railroads were free to employ whom they pleased,
whatever might be their whim or caprice in the matter; that the
contract did not create a monopoly which interfered with or prevented others, unlawfully, from exercising freedom of contract
in relation to the sale of labor; that there was a practical reason
for the making of the contract; apd that the agreement -was not
exclusive in that it provided for the employment of a percentage
of Brotherhood trainmen not out of proportion to their numbers.
The court further stated that the contract was not against public
policy, "as it in no way affects the real needs of the people in
their health, safety, comfort, or convenience."
In New York there are several cases of this type. In the
earliest one, that of Curran v. Galct,23 the defendants had threat178 S. W. 38 (Texas, x915).
"152 N. Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897).
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ened the plaintiff that unless he would join their union they would
procure his discharge from his employment as an engineer, and
they carried this threat into execution. The defendants pleaded
a contract between the Ale Brewers Association and the Bre.wery
Workingmen's Local Assembly, 1796, Knights of Labor, which
provided that all employees of the brewing companies should be
members of the Assembly, and that no other employee should
work for a longer period than four weeks without becoming a
member. The court held that this defense was insufficient to
prevent the plaintiff from recovering damages. On the other
hand, in National Protective Association of Steam Fitters and
Helpers v. Cu1nnzing,' 4 the coiirt, held, per Parker, C. J., that
a labor-union may refuse to permit its members to work with
fellow-servants who are members of a rival organization, and
may notify the employer to that effect and that a strike will be
ordered unless such servants are discharged, where its action
is based upon a proper motive, such as a purpose to secure only
the employment of efficient and approved workmen, or to secure
an exclusive preference of employment to its members on their
own terms and conditions, provided that no force is employed
and no unlawful act is committed; if, under such circumstances,
the employees objected to are discharged, neither they nor the
organization of which they are members have a right of action
5
against the union or its members. In Jacobs v. Cohen," a contract was held not to be violative of public policy which was entered into between employers and a labor-union and which provided that the former agreed-for a certain period to employ and
retain only members of the union in good standing, and the latter,
for the same period, bound themselves to furnish the services of
8
its members. And in Kissam v. U. S. PrintingCo.,1 there was
an action brought by stockholders and employees of a printing
company to restrain the company and certain labor-unions from
carrying out an agreement whereby the printing company agreed
2417o N. Y. 35, 63 N. E. 369 (i902).
(0gos).
183 N. Y. 2o7, 76 N.E.
gg N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910).
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to employ none but members of the unions in question and to
discharge all employees in certain departments who should refuse to become members of said unions. The trial court found
that the execution of this agreement resulted in great financial
benefit to the company; that it disposed of the differences between
the parties; that it was not entered into for the purpose of gratifying malice against the non-union employees of the printing
company or of inflicting injury upon them; that it was not the
object of the defendants to compel the plaintiffs to join the
unions; that no pressure so imperative as to amount to compulsion was exerted upon the company with regard to the discharge
of the plaintiffs from their employment; and that there was no
conspiracy to compel the plaintiffs to join the unions or solely
to injure them in their employment. It was held that such findings of fact led properly to the legal conclusion that the agreement was in all respects lawful; that no unlawful act had been
committed by the defendants; and that the complaint should be
dismissed. It will be noted in passing that here again the court
touches into the question of the motive which prompted the
parties to enter into the agreement, and ventures the finding that
the paramount purpose was merely to benefit the parties and was
not based upon a malicious desire to injure third persons who
were not the beneficiaries of the contract.
In Massachusetts also there are Some variations in the decisions, dependent upon the circumstances under which the cases
arose. In Hoban v. Dempsey 27 there was a contract between
the members of a labor-union of longshoremen and the representatives of certain steamship companies, by which it was agreed
that all longshoremen employed by the steamship companies
should be members of that union whenever such men were available, and that, whenever such men were not available, men not
members of that union might be employed. It -was held that if
the agreement was entered into freely and fairly for the mutual
benefit of the contracting parties without any -intention of injuring other longshoremen or of coercing them into joining the
p217

Mass. 166, io4 N. E. 717 (194).
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union, it was valid, and that its performance would not be ent
joined in a suit in equity brought by longshoremen in the same
port who were not members of that union. The court said that
there was nothing of the boycott about the contract, since an
essential element of the boycott is intentional injury to somebody. And so in Tracey z,. Osborne,18 there were agreements
between members of an unincorporated labor-union and manufacturers, to continue in force for one year, providing for arbitration, pending which there were to be no strikes or lockouts,
that all work of the manufacturers should be done by members
of the union, and that, so long as there was a sufficient number
of these to do the work, no other help should be employed by
the manufacturers. It was held that these agreements were
valid, and that a suit in equity might be maintained by the members of such union against the members of another unincorporated union to enjoin the defendants from taking any action
to cause or intended to cause the breaking of such agreements.
9
On the other hand, in Plent v. Woods, it was held that if the
members of one labor-union conspire to compel the members of
another union of the same craft to join the former union, from
which they had withdrawn, and to carry out their purpose
threaten strikes and boycotts to induce the employers of the members of the latter union either to get them to ask for reinstatement in the former union, or, failing so to do, then to discharge
them, such conspiracy, and the acts in pursuance of it, were unlawful, and might be restrained by injunction; (Holmes, C. J.
dissenting). The same comment might be made on this decision
as on the Pennsylvania case of Erdnian v. Mitchell, pieviously
21
discussed.20 In Berry v. Donovan, it was held that if a manufacturer makes an agreement with a labor-union to employ only
its members, and that he will not retain any worker in his employ
after receiving notice from the union that such worker is objectionable to the union for any cause, whatever rights this agreeMass. 25, 114 N. E. g (1917).
176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. ioxI (i900).
"Supra, note &"
31188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 6o3 (igoS).
226
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nient might give the contracting parties in relation to each other,
it did not justify an agent of the union in demanding and procuring the discharge of a workman by the manufacturer because
the workman was not a member of the union. In Folsom v.
LCeis, 2 2 it was held that a strike by a labor-union to compel employers to employ none but union men, or non-union men provided that they should join the union within thirty days, would
be enjoined as an unlawful act, where its real object was to force
the employers to submit to an attempt to obtain for the union
a complete monopoly of the labor market. The court said that
"Conduct directly affecting an employer to his detriment, by interference with his business, is not justifiable in law, unless it
is of a kind and for a purpose that has a direct relation to benefits that the laborers are trying to obtain. Strengthening the
forces of a labor union to put it in a better condition to enforce
its claims in controversies that may afterwards arise with employers is not enough to justify an attack upon the business of
an employer by inducing his employees to strike." And finally,
23
in Shinsky v. Tracey, where a labor-union, which controlled
ninety per cent. of the laborers employed in the shoe industry
of a certain city, made with several of the manufacturers a contract which provided that so long as the unions were in a position to furnish help to do the work no other help might be employed, and where a member of the union was expelled for becoming a member of a rival organization, and, to discipline him,
the union got his employer to discharge him, and made it impossible for him to get work with any of ninety per cent. of the factories in the city because they were controlled by the union, and
highly improbable that he could obtain work with any of the
other ten per cent., it was held that the discharged laborer was
a sufferer from the consequences of an illegal boycott, and couldmaintain a suit in equity to enjoin the union from further interference with his right to labor, and for damages.
In Lehigh StructuralSteel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting and Re=208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316 (19!!).
=226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957 (1917).
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fining Works,2 4 there was a contract between an association
representing nearly all the building contractors of New York
City and an association representing the labor-unions thereof,
binding the contractors to employ only'union men in their enterprises therein, and having for its object the closed shop. It was
held, per Backes, V. C., that this monopolization of the labor
market by the unions violated public policy, the court saying:
"The principle of the closed shop, i. e., the monopolization of the
labor market, has found no judicial sponsor. In whatever form
organized labor has asserted it, whether to the injury of the employer, or to labor, or to labor-unions outside of the fold, the
judiciary of the country has responded, uniformly, that it is
inimical to the freedom of individual pursuit guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land, and contravenes public policy...
None [of the courts] has gone to the length of sanctioning a
strike for a closed shop, which has for its object the exclusion
from work of workmen who are not members of the organization."
In Connors v. Connolly,25 a contract was entered into by
labor-unions and substantially all the manufacturers in the chief
industry of a locality, to the effect that union workmen only
should thereafter be employed. It was held that such an agreement was contrary to public -policy, since its tendency was to
expose a non-union workman to the tyranny of the will of others,
and therefore to create a monopoly which would exclude what he
had to dispose of, and what other people might need, from the
open market, or perhaps from any market. Accordingly it was
further held that the plaintiff, a hat maker in Danbury, who was
discharged from employment and prevented from getting work
by the defendants, members of a labor-union, could have redress
for the wrong inflicted upon him, notwithstanding the defendants' attempt to justify their conduct by the existence of an agreement between the representative of their union and nearly all
the hat manufacturers of Danbury and vicinity not to employ
At. 376 (xigo).

"92

N. J.Eq. 131, 1i

'86

Conn. 641, 86 At. 6oo (x913).
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non-union workmen. The court cited the New York case of
Curran ,. Gakn
C26 and the Massachusetts case of Berry ,. Donovan,27 above referred to, as giving countenance to the broad
principle that every agreement, whatever the conditions, by a
labor-union with an employer, which provides that the latter
should not employ, either at all or in any given department of his
work, any other persons than union members, was contrary to
public policy. The court disclaimed any intention to base its
decision upon such a sweeping proposition, but did assert the
doctrine, which it stated that all of the authorities approved,
that "where the agreement is one which takes in an entire industry of any considerable proportions in a community, so that
it operates generally in that community to prevent or to seriously
deter craftsmen from working at their craft, or workingmen
obtaining employment under favorable c6nditions without joining a union, it is contrary to public policy." The court said-that
"Whether a contract is opposed to public policy or not does not
depend upon the actual results which may happen to follow its
operation in each particular case, but upon what the contract
itself threatens, what its evil tendencies are, and what possibilities of harm to the general welfare lie within it."
It will thus be seen that, generally speaking, agreements are
valid when entered into between labor-unions and employers and
provide as to a type or group of labor that should be exclusively
accepted by the employer, but that this general doctrine does not
apply to a case where the practical result of the agreement is to
work a monopoly of the labor market, and where, in- effect, it
prevents other workmen from being able to labor at their trade
in the vicinity where the agreement is entered into. It is also
subject apparently, in some jurisdictions, to the question of the
motive upon which the agreement is based; that is to say, whether
or not there is indicated any malicious intent to injure third
persons. And, finally, it would appear that a threat on the part
of a union to call off its members on strike unless certain work"Supra, note z3.
"Supra, note 2z.
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men are discharged by the employer presents a different case
than where there is an existing agreement between the union
and the employer that only the members of that union should be
employed, although the logic of such a distinction may be questioned, in that if it be lawful for an employer to agree with a
union to employ only its members, it would seem that he could
properly acquiesce in a situation where the union demands such
a result, and where, in pursuance thereof, he is led to discharge
an employee not belonging to that union.
This brings us to the third group of cases-those in which
agreements are made among employers, binding themselves not
to employ certain individuals or groups of workmen, or among
employees that they will not work for certain employers or types
of employer. In these cases there are conflicting decisions, or
at least irreconcilable dicta, but perhaps this condition is to be
expected in the case of so difficult a subject and one likely to
involve diverse viewpoints in regard to the relations of labor
and capital.
The leading English case upon the subject seems to be that
of Mihwral Water Bottle Exchange v. Booth.28 In that case a
society established for the protection of a particular trade contained a rule that no member should employ any traveller,
carman, or outdoor employee, who had left the service of another member, without the consent in writing of his late employer until after the. expiration of two years. It was held that
this rule was unreasonable, in restraint of trade and void, Chitty,
J., pointing out that this was not an agreement between the employer and the employed, but among employers of labor; and
Fry, L J., saying that the restraint of trade involved was far in
excess of any legitimate purpose of the contracting parties.
In Blunicnthal v. Shazu, - 9 the defendants discharged one of
their employees, and thereupon notified the other morocco manufacturers in the place that he had left defendants' employ and
that the others should not employ him. There was an agreement
' 36 CIL Div- 465 (Eng, 1907).
"77 Fed. 954 (C. C. A, 1897).
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or understanding amung the manufacturers covering such cases,
and, as a result thereof, he was generally refused employment, and two of the manufacturers who had employed him in
ignorance of his identity discharged him. It was held that he
had a good cause of actin for damages, the implied inference
of the decision being that the agreement among the nianufacturers was invalid.

a°
In Trinble -z.Prudential Life Insurancc Company, three

insurance companies agreed that they would not employ any one
who had been discharged by either of the other two. It was held
31
that the agreement was contrary to public policy.
32
In McCord v. Thompson-Starrett Co., it was held that an
order of a building trades employers association, embracing
nearly every prominent building contractor in New York, which
instructed its members that no men might be set to work or retained at work who did not join a particular labor-union was
void as against public policy. The court based its decision upon
the ground that "While an individual employer may lawfully
agree with a labor-union to employ only its members, because
such an agreement is not of an oppressive nature operating generally throughout the community to prevent craftsmen in the
trade from obtaining employment and earning their livelihood, yet
such an agreement when participated in by all or by a large proportion of employers in any community becomes oppressive and
contrary to public policy, because it operates generally upon the
craftsmen in the trade, and imposes upon them, as a penalty
for refusing to join the favored union, the practical impossibility
of obtaining employment at their trade and thereby gaining a
livelihood." 33
34
On the other hand, in Atlkins v. 1 7 . A. Fletcher Co., it was
said that "Employers have the right to combine freely to refuse
'*64 S. NV. 915 (KY., 1901).
'A similar agreement was held illegal inCheek v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 192 S. W . 387 (Mo., 1917).
= 129 App. Div. 130, 113 N. Y. Supp. 385 (19o8).

'The same doctrine is laid down in Grassi Contract~g Company v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, i6o N. Y. Supp. 279 (xgi6).
8
3'65 N. J. Eq. 65 , 55 Atl. zo74 (19o3).
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employment to any kind or class of workmen precisely as employees have a right to combine freely to refuse to be employed
to employ workmen of whom they
by :y employer who sees fit
disapprove, or sees fit in any respect to conduct his business contrary to their views." In Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v.
Minneapolis Musicians Association," a rule of the defendant
corporation that none of its members. all of whom were musicians, should accept empioyment in theatres or opera houses,
except upon certain conditions, was held valid. In Commonwealth v. Hunt,:4 it was held lawful for journeymen bootmakers
to form themselves into a club and agree together not to work
for any master bootmaker who should employ any journeyman
not a member of said club, after notice given to such master to
discharge such workman. __In Nea, York, Chicago and St. Louis
R. R. Co. v. Sc/affr," it was held lawful for railroad companies
to agree to furnish to each other information as to all of their
respective employees who had quit-work during a strike and also
as to all of their employees who were members of the American
Railway Union. and further to agree that such employees would
not be employed by any of said companies without a "clearance,"
that is, a release and consent from the railroad company last
employing the employee in question. In Rhodes Bros. Co. Z,.
8
Musicians Protective Union," a by-law of a union was held
lawful which provided that members should not, under penalty
of a fine, play for any theatre which had broken a contract with
any member of the union. Accordingly it was decided that an
injunction would not lie in favor of the proprietor of a dance
hall against the union to prevent the enforcement of this by-law,
even though the effect of it was to prevent him from employing
union musicians. The court said that the b"-law "left the members of the union free, in one sense, to enter the employment of
the complainant, although it practically compelled them to choose
between the benefits of such an engagement and membership in
"118
3

Min.410, 136 N. W. 1o9 (1912).
MCtc. lx1(Mass., 1842).
"165 Ohio 414, 62 N. E. io36 (19o).
34

'37

R.

. 281, 9z At. 641 (1915).
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And in Goldfield Consolidated Mines Company v.

Goldfield Miners Union No. 22-o,3" it was ruled that an agreement
among mine operators that they would not employ any person
who belonged to a certain- labor organization, or to any organization affiliated therewith, does not constitute an unlawful conspiracy against such organization or its members.
It thus appears, as already stated, that the authorities are
far from being uniform on the question as to whether or not
agreements are valid when they are entered into among emplovers, and provide for what is practically a boycott of certain
employees or classes of employees, or among employees and
provide for a similar kind of boycott or discrimination against
certain employers or groups of employers. The cases cited would
seem to indicate that there is no definite rule or principle adopted
by the courts which furnishes a test for the determination of the
problem, and yet it is precisely in this group of cases that the
subject under discussion falls, since the agreement here under
consideration was, in effect, one between Davis and his fellowworkmen who constituted the unincorporated association known
,
as the Philadelphia Electrotypers and Finishers Union No. 72
in which they agreed among themselves not to enter into the
employ of certain employers, namely, those running non-union
shops. Perhaps, however, from a considefation of the authorities and from the discussion hereinbefore entered into, certain
general principles applicable to the determination of the question
involved may be laid down as being indicated by the weight of
authority.
The writer attempts to formulate these principles as follows:
i. The first inquiry that must be made in seeking to ascertain whether such an agreement is valid is as to whether or not
it is reasonable as between the contracting parties themselves;
that is to say, whether it is fairly and bona fide necessitated by
their economic and industrial interests. This involves a consideration, inter alia, of the period of duration of the contract.
1359Fed. 5oo

(C. C., i9o8).
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Thus, in the case under analysis, a period of duratiun during
which the mechanic remains a memnber of his union will seem to
he reasonable. Nxhercas a fixed period of iwo years can apparently
be justified only if required by the necessities of collective bargaining or similar circumstances. If the contract is unreasonable as between the parties it will not be upheld by the courts,
being in'the nature of a restraint of labor.
2. Even. however, if the agreement be reasonable from the
standpoint of the contracting parties. the question still remains
as to whether or not it is consistent with public policy, and since
public policy is necessarily a matter of more or less vagueness
and fluctuates with changing social, economic and industrial conditions, it is impossible in any given case to venture an exact
prediction as to the attitude of the courts in regard to it.
3. An important element is as to the extent to which the
contract will work a monopoly in the labor market and a consequent hardship upon those militated against by the terms of the
contract. If, for example, the result of such an agreement be
that some of the members of the craft are practically excluded
from pursuing their calling in the vicinity, or if, on the other
hand, the employer is seriously restricted in his choice of workmen to a small and inadequate group, then, and in other circumstances of a similar nature which may be imagined, the agreement will be held unlawful.
4. While, perhaps, illogical, and difficult of practical application, weight is given in many of the cases to the proposition
that the question of intent is important; that is to say, whether
the primary purpose is to enhance the welfare of the contracting
parties, or, in the exercise of spite or malice, to injure third persons, and whether the controlling motive is to strengthen the
militant forces of the union or of the employers, as the case may
be, rather than to follow the reasonable necessities of the specific
situation.
5. Some of the authorities seem to indicate that an agreement restricting the choice of employment may be valid, whereas
a concerted effort on the part of employees to obtain the same
results, as for example by a strike or threats of a strike, even if
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acquiesced in by the employer, would, as against third persons
harmed thereby, be invalid.
6. A result arising fromn an agreement between employer
and employees, or perhaps between an employer and a labor-union
representing such employees, may be held valid and unobjectionable, whereas the same result may fail to obtain judicial sanction
if it arises from an agreement among a group of employers or
among a group of employees. The probable reason for this is
that in the latter case the agreement takes on more of an aspect
of conspiracy to harm the interests of third persons or of a third
group.
7. And, upon final analysis. the entire question must be
viewed from the standpoint of the r-fiect a decision determining
it would have upon the industrial Norld. Though the laws of
reasoning, and even of meticulous judicial consistency, may apparently call for a certain result, the courts probably will treat the
matter empirically and depart from theoretical logic if, in the
opinion of the judges, aiming to express prevailing economic and
industrial doctrines, the public welfare would otherwise be injuriously affected. This is the very essence of the doctrine of
public policy. It is therefore believed that, whatever may be the
force of abstract reasoning, if a broad view of public policy will
seem to allow a judicial approval, or on the other hand to necessitate a judicial disapproval, of an arrangement which might be
likely to result in capital and labor both seeking to sign up each
workman as he attains his majority and then and there to align
him for a definite period upon the side of trade-unionism or
against it, there is little doubt that the courts will not hesitate to
hold such an agreement legal or illegal accordingly.
In any event, the question presented by the Cincinnati and
Philadelphia cases which are the subject of this article is not only
interesting from a lawyer's standpoint, but is so generally important as a new problem in the relations of labor and capital,
that it is well worthy of study.
Horace Stern.
Phila.,Pa.

